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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL AND APPEAL
I

The issues before the Court oil this Cross-Appeal and
Appeal are twofold:
(1)

Did the trial court err yhen it interpreted the

Utah Product Liability Act statute of depose, Utah Code Ann.,
Section

78-15-3

extended

the

(1953),

two-year

to be

a

limitation

statute
on

of

limitation

Wrongful

death

which

actions

otherwise mandated by Utah Code Ann., Section 78-12-28 (1953)?
(2)

Did the trial court err irt retroactively applying

this Court's decision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d
670

(Utah

1985),

which

held

the Utah

Product

Liability

Act

unconstitutional?
STATEMENT OF THE CA^E
This is a wrongful death actioiji filed by the plaintiff
nearly three and one-half years after tljie death of his wife in
an

automobile

fire.

Defendants

Saab

answered

plaintiff's

Complaint and subsequently moved for Judgment on the Pleadings,
asserting that plaintiff's action was bdrred by Utah's two-year
limitation on wrongful death actions, l^tah Code Ann., Section
78-12-28
Saabs'

(1953).

motion,

The
ruling

Honorable
that

Judith

plaintiff's

M.

Billings

Complaint

was

denied
timely

filed because the Utah Product Liability Act statute of repose,
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-15-3 (1953), was a statute of limitation which superseded the wrongful death limitation.
A)
-1-

(Appendix

Subsequently, defendant Ken Garff (dismissed from this
action and not a party to this appeal) answered plaintiff's
Complaint and moved for Summary Judgment, which the Honorable
Peter F. Leary denied based on Judge Billings' prior ruling.
Defendant Garff petitioned for an intermediate appeal which was
denied.
After this Court declared the Utah Product Liability
Act unconstitutional in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.f 717 P.2d
670 (Utah 1985), the Honorable John A. Rokich, ruling that the
decision

retroactively

invalidated

the

statute

of

repose,

granted defendants' Saab Motion for Summary Judgment. (Appendix
B)
Plaintiff has appealed Judge Rokich's ruling on the
retroactivity

issue, and defendants

Saab have

cross-appealed

Judge Billings' ruling on the applicability of the statute of
repose.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's wife, Rhonda Luther Raithaus, died in an
automobile fire on July 2, 1979. (R.3-4)

Plaintiff filed this

wrongful death action on November 29, 1982. (R.6)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A statute of limitation prescribes the period of time
during which a plaintiff must bring his (her) action after the
cause of action has accrued or waive his

-2-

(her) remedy.

By

contrast, a statute of repose immunizes a defendant from liability after a given period of time commencing with an event
unrelated to the accrual of the cause of action•

This Court has

implied and courts in other jurisdictions have specifically held
that a statute of repose does not extend the period prescribed by
the statute of limitation applicable to the cause of action.

To

hold otherwise would fly in the face of the Utah Legislature's
manifest intent.
Even if the Utah Product Liability Act statute of
repose did supersede the wrongful death limitations statute, this
Court's decision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670
(Utah 1985), declaring the Utah Product Liability Act unconstitutional,

retroactively

applies

to

the

plaintiff,

because

he

neither relied on the statute of repose nor demonstrated that
the inequities of applying the decision to him outweigh the
burdens created by only selective retroactive application.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The

on

plaintiff's

appeal demonstrate the ironic nature of this case.

Contrary to

what

parties'

one might

respective

positions

expect, the defendant manufacturers maintain

that this Court's decision in Berry v. feeech Aircraft Corp.,717
P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), declaring the Utah Product Liability Act
unconstitutional, should be applied retroactively to all cases in
litigation

at the time of the decisipn.
-3-

By contrast, the

plaintiff consumer asserts that the Utah Product Liability Act
statute of repose has continuing viability after Berry.
This curious situation evolved as a result of the
plaintiff's delay in filing his action and the trial court's
novel construction of the Utah Product Liability Act's statute of
repose.

Plaintiff filed his action three and one-half years

after the death of his wife—one and one-half years beyond the
two-year

statute

of limitation

applicable to wrongful death

actions, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-12-28 (1953).

Plaintiff's

legal premise, which the trial court accepted, is that the
Utah Product Liability Act's statute of repose, Utah Code Ann.,
Section 78-15-3 (1953), is a statute of limitation which extended
the time in which plaintiff could file his action.
Plaintiff's appeal is dependent on the validity of his
premise, and if this premise is incorrect, the plaintiff's appeal
is moot.

Accordingly, defendants Saab will first address the

issue presented by their cross-appeal and thereafter respond to
the arguments plaintiff has presented on his appeal.
POINT I.

THE UTAH PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT STATUTE

OF REPOSE IS NOT A. STATUTE OF LIMITATION AND WAS
NEVER INTENDED TO EXTEND THE PERIOD IN WHICH THE

PLAINTIFF COULD FILE HIS WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION.
A.

This Court has recognized that a statute of repose is not a
statute of limitation.
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah

1985),

the

Court

noted

that there are critical

between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose:
-4-

differences

Statutes of repose, such as section 3 of the
Products Liability Act, are different from
statutes of limitations, although to some
extent they serve the same ends.
Id. at 672.

A statute of limitation is designed to provide a

reasonable period of time in which a plaintiff must bring an
action after his (her) cause of action his accrued or waive his
(her) remedy. Id.

Further, statutes of limitation "are designed

to promote justice by preventing surprise^ through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories

have

faded, and witnesses have disappeared."

Meyers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah, 1981) (citing Order of
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express(Agency, Inc., 321 U.S.
342, 348-49, 64 S. Ct. 582, 586, 88 L.Edj. 788, 792 (1944)).
contrast, statutes

By

of repose are not designed to provide a

reasonable time for the filing of an action once it arises.
Berryf 717 P.2d at 672. Specifically, th£ Utah Product liability
Act statute of repose was designed to immunize manufacturers and
persons in the manufacturers1 chain of distribution six years
after sale or ten years after manufacture of the product regardless of when an injury occurred.

Jd. at 673.

The policies

undergirding the statute of repose were tfie availability and cost
of liability insurance.
(1953).

See, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-15-2

Because the goals and functions of the two types of

statutes differ, the statutes are not interchangeable.

-5-

B.

This Court has implied and courts in other jurisdictions
have held that a statute of repose does not extend the
limitation otherwise provided by the applicable statute of
limitation.
By implication, this Court has already indicated that

the Utah

Product Liability Act's statute of repose must be

construed together with the applicable statute of limitation:
Section 3 of the Utah Product Liability Act
bars actions without regard to when an
injury occurs and is not designed to provide
a reasonable time within which to file a
lawsuit.
Indeed, a statute of repose may
cut off a cause of action even though it is
filed within the period allowed by the
relevant statute of limitations.
Berry, 717 P.2d at p. 672.

(Emphasis added.)

If indeed, as plaintiff contends, the statute of repose doubles
as a statute of limitation in product liability actions, the
emphasized portion of the quote has no meaning.

Although the

quoted language is dicta, it does accord with decisions of courts
in other jurisdictions which have specifically considered the
issue.
In

Grissom

v.

North

American

Aviation,

Inc., 325

F.Supp. 465 (M.D. Fla 1971), a case similar to the case at bar,
the widow of Astronaut Virgil "Gus11 Grissom filed a wrongful
death action against the defendant engineer nearly four years
after the death of her husband.

The applicable Florida statute

of limitation provided that a wrongful death action had to be
brought within two years of the decedent's death.

Nonetheless,

Mrs. Grissom maintained that her action was timely, citing a
Florida statute of repose which stated that no action against a
-6-

professional engineer could be maintained after twelve years
following the date of substantial completion of construction.
After examining analogous statutes in otiher jurisdictions, the
court stated:
This Court believes the morfe reasonable
application of [section] 95.11(10) [statute
of repose] and the only correct interpretation is that a professional engineer or
architect is susceptible to suit for a period
of only twelve (12) years, and that a
plaintiff, once death occurs, has not more
than two (2) years in which to bring suit or
have the action barred. If de^th occurs or
the defect is found more thari twelve (12)
years after completion of the work, no
wrongful death suit could be maintained.
Id. 468.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reached a similar conclusion in
O'Connor v. Altus, 335 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1975) while interpreting an
analogous architect's statute of repose:
As do many of its counterparts in other
states, N.J.S.A. 2A: 14-1.1 [statute of
repose] impliedly incorporates the tort
limitation act generally applying to all
personal injury actions. Hence), this state's
two-year statute of limitations), N.J.S.A. 2A:
14-2, does operate to restrict the period in
which actions can be initiated for accidents
occurring within ten years after construction; but it does not serve to, extend beyond
ten years from the date construction was
completed the time within whiqh suit may be
filed.
For example, an action for pergonal injuries
sustained by an adult in an accident occurring, say, five years after the completion
of construction still must be brought within
two years thereafter—or sevep years after
construction. This statute doeis not preserve
the remedy, in that instance, for an additional five years or until the full ten
years from construction has elapsed.
As
-7-

indicated, both the two-year and ten-year
statutes are at work in that situation. The
latter does not expand the two-year period
of the personal injury statute.
It simply
provides that in any event the suit must be
started within ten years of the construction,
regardless of when the cause of action
accrues. (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 553. Other cases reaching the same result include Cadieux
v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 593 F.2d 142 (1st
Cir. 1979); Comptroller of Virginia ex. rel. Virginia Military
Institute v. King, 232 S.E.2d 895 (Va. 1977); Smith v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation, 248 S.E.2d 462 (N.C.
App. 1978)(overruled on other grounds).
C.

The Utah Legislature's intent in enacting the Utah Products
Liability Act was to reduce, not extend, the period during
which a manufacturer would be exposed to liability.
As stated in Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 609

P.2d

934

(Utah

1980),

Care Malpractice Act,
construing

a case

of

[t]his Court's primary responsibility in

legislative

the Utah

the Utah Health

fl

enactments

legislature's underlying intent."
review

interpreting

Product

is to give effect to the
Id. at 936.

Liability

Even a cursory

Act reveals that the

legislature intended to enact a statute which would limit the
liability of product manufacturers and other persons in the
manufacturers' chain of distribution.

In its declaration of

intent, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-15-2 (1953), the legislature
specifically

referred

liability suits,
these actions,

to

(1) the

rising

number

of

product

(2) the amount of judgments and settlements in
(3) the rising cost of insurance premiums, and
-8-

(4)

the

availability

legislature

of product

insurance.

Clearly, the

intended to provide means to limit or otherwise

narrow the exposure faced by manufacturers and other persons in
the distribution chain.
pret the Utah

It would be anomalous indeed to inter-

Product Liability Act's statute of repose as

enlarging, rather than narrowing, the timef in which a prospective
plaintiff could bring an action against the very parties the act
sought to protect.
The

court

in Cadieux v.

International

Telephone &

Telegraph Corp., 593 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 3J979) , while examining a
statute very similar to the Utah Product^ Liability Act, had no
illusions regarding the Rhode Island legislature's intent:
Finally, appellant's argument based on the
"solicitude of the Rhode Islaitd Legislature
for the unique burdens of the products
liability victim", allegedly demonstrated in
the 1978 amendment of R.I.Gl. L. [section]
9-1-13, does not impress us. The amendment
provides that products liability cases shall
be brought "within ten (10) years after the
date the product was first purchased for use
or consumption."
We do not read this
amendment as creating a new ten year period
to bring products liability suits. Rather,
the amendment clearly provides that the
ten year period after the sale of the
offending product is an additional limit on
suits brought within the existing statutes
that relate to the date of th|e injury. If
R.I.G.L. [section] 9-1-13 demonstrates
solicitude
for any group, it is for the
manufacturers who, prior to July 1, 1978, had
no statutory protection from suit that was
related to the date of original sale of a
product.
Id. at 144-145.
-9-

The

Utah

Product

Liability

Act

statute

of

repose

does nothing more or less than confer an immunity upon a manufacturer and the persons in the manufacturer's chain of distribution six years after the date of initial purchase of the product
or ten years after manufacture of the product regardless of the
time of injury.

This statute of repose does not pretend to

designate the time within which a plaintiff must bring an action
once it has accrued.
limitation.

This is the function of the statute of

The applicable limitation in this instance is

the two-year limitation on actions for wrongful death, and since
the plaintiff did not file his action within two years of his
wife's death, his action is barred as a matter of law.
POINT II; EVEN IF PLAINTIFF'S CONSTRUCTION
OF THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IS CORRECT, THERE
IS NO REASON TO EXEMPT THE PLAINTIFF FROM
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE BERRY DECISION
WHICH DECLARED THE UTAH PRODUCT LIABILITY
STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
A.

Decisions overruling prior law are normally given retrospective effect.
In Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), a case

declaring the Utah Guest Statute unconstitutional, this court
noted:
The general rule from time immemorial is
that the ruling of a court is deemed to
state the true nature of the law both
retrospectively and prospectively. In civil
cases, at least, constitutional law neither
requires nor prohibits retroactive operation of an overruling decision, but in the
vast majority of cases a decision is effective both prospectively and retrospectively,
-10-

even an overruling decision.
added, citations omitted.)
Id. at 676.

(Emphasis

The general rule is abrogated only in those circum-

stances where a class of actual or pcprential litigants has
justifiably relied on the prior law or where the burden dictates
only

prospective

application.

State

^Farm Mutual

Insurance

Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 27 Utalfi 2d 166, 493 P.2d 1002
(1972) and Loyal Order of Moose No. 259
257 (Utah 1982).

V. County Bd., 657 P.2d

Under the standards previously set by this

Court, the Berry decision should be retroajctively applied.
B.

The plaintiff has not demonstrated that he justifiably
relied on the Utah Product Liability Act statute of repose.
In State Farm Mutual Insurance do. v. Farmers Insurance

Exchange, 27 Utah 2d 166, 493 P.2d 1002, (J1972) , the Court stated
the following with respect to retroactive application of a ruling
concerning subrogation rights:
The rule [of prospective application] is
based upon the proposition that where
persons had entered into contracts and other
business relationships based upon justifiable
reliance on the prior decisions of courts,
those persons would be substantially harmed
if retroactive effect were given to overruling decisions. An additional factor was
that retroactive operation might greatly
burden the administration of justice.
Id. at 168-169, 493 P. 2d at 1003.

It is ctlear from the foregoing

language that prospective application applies where persons have
consciously entered into relationships based on express reliance
on prior

law

or decisions.

proposition are as follows:

Further cases supporting this
Loyal Ord^r of Moose No. 259 v.

-11-

County Bd. , 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982)—organizations relied on
criteria
decision;

for tax exempt property established by prior court
Timpanogos

Planning

& Water

Central Utah Water Conservancy

Management

Agency

District, 690 P.2d

562

v,

(Utah

1984)—water district conducted business for decades on basis of
unconstitutional selection of board members; and Rio Algom Corp.
v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984)—taxing authorities
set mill levies in reliance on unconstitutional statute.
In contrast to the above cases, however, the Court has
not accepted the reliance argument in absence of evidence of
actual reliance, especially when the claimed reliance would not
appear to accord with everyday experience.

For example, in

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661 (Utah 1984), the Guest Statute
case, the defendants petitioned

for rehearing, claiming that

this Court's ruling declaring the Guest Statute unconstitutional
should not be retroactively applied to them.

In analyzing the

issue, this Court stated:
There is no evidence that the defendants
knew of the Guest Statute and relied upon it
in offering a ride to the plaintiff.
The
bare assertion by defendants that our
decision overrules prior cases sustaining
the constitutionality of the Guest Statute,
is insufficient to prohibit its retroactive
application.
Id. at 676.

The plaintiff in this action has made absolutely no

showing that he relied in any way on the Utah Product Liability
Act statute of repose.

The plaintiff has not asserted, nor

would one expect him to reasonably assert: either (1) that he
-12-

first consulted the Utah Product Liability Act before purchasing
the Saab automobile at issue here in order to determine the
amount of years he would have after the purchase of the automobile to bring a cause of action or (2) that he rejected one
automobile in favor of the Saab automobilq because of an extended
period

of

limitation.

Furthermore,

the

plaintiff

has

not

asserted that even after his cause of action arose, he consulted
the Utah Product Liability Act and consciously forebore bringing
this action within two years after the death of his wife because
of the act.

Of course, plaintiff is asserting here that he

relied on the limitation once he filed this action.

However,

that type of reliance is obviously an insufficient basis to
preclude retroactive application of the Berry decision.

Other-

wise, the defendants in Malan who were relying on the Guest
Statute defense would have prevailed.

4ince the plaintiff has

made no showing of his conscious reliance on the Utah Product
Liability Act statute of repose in either purchasing his automobile or delaying the filing of this action, he has no basis to
assert that the Berry decision should have only prospective
effect.
C.

The plaintiff would burden the administration of justice by
his proposal that this Court selectively apply the Berry
decision.
Under the plaintiff's construction of the Utah Product

Liability

Act

statute

of

repose, each

person

injured by a

product would have a time limitation which differed from time
-13-

periods

applicable

to

other

persons

with

similar

injuries

depending on the fortuitous combination of circumstance dictated
by the product's date of purchase, the product's date of manufacture, and the date of the person's injury.

For example, the

person injured on the date of purchase of a new product would
have six years to bring his (her) action.

By contrast, a person

such as the plaintiff in Berry who was injured by a 23-year old
product would have absolutely no time to bring his (her) cause of
action.

Between these extremes are approximately 2190 possible

limitation periods (6 years x 3 65 days per year).
Obviously, the plaintiff
decision

must

plaintiffs

in

be

retroactively

Berry's

position

recognizes that the Berry

applied
to

to

maintain

permit
their

potential
actions.

Accordingly, plaintiff blithely asserts that there should be
selective retroactive application of the Berry decision exempting
those parties who have "vested rights." Although there are cases
in which various courts have limited their decisions to operate
prospectively or limited their decisions retroactively only to
the parties who brought about the overruling decision, defendants
are unaware of any precedent by which a court has retroactively
applied the decision to only selected parties among the parties
in litigation at the time the overruling decision was issued.
Plaintiff's seemingly innocuous solution to his retroactivity

problem

invites the Court to engage in an ad hoc

legislative effort.

Plaintiff maintains that each injured party
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having a cause of action at the time the Berry decision was
issued has a vested right in the period mandated by the statute
of repose at the time the cause of acjtion accrued.

For an

injured party in plaintiff's position, the statute would allow
the party nearly three and one-half years to bring his (her)
action.

However, for parties who were injured by products which

had been purchased between five and six ydars before the cause of
action accrued, the limitation period would be less than one
year.

Since this Court has stated thjat a valid statute of

limitation must provide a reasonable tijne in which an injured
party has an opportunity to assert his (her) cause of action,
Berry, 717 P.2d at 672, the courts would be left with the burden
of determining at what point prior to the expiration of the
six-year period an injured party had had that reasonable opportunity.

In essence, the plaintiff invites the Court to abandon

its role as arbiter of the constitution and rewrite the statute
to accommodate the vagaries of a "limitations statute" which
commences on a date completely independent of the date of injury.
In

contrast

retrospective

to

application

the

chaotic

would

situation

caus0,

a

a

full

selective

retroactive

application of the Berry decision wouldj simplify and stabilize
the law.

Under full retroactive application, each injured party

would have the same amount of time after his (her) cause of
action accrued in which to bring his (her) action under the
limitations

statutes

prescribed
-15-

in

Utah

Code

Ann.

Section

78-12-1 et. seq.

(1953).

The benefits of certainty in the

judicial process engendered by a fully retroactive application of
the Berry decision far outweigh the prejudice to the plaintiff
who delayed three and one-half years after his cause of action
accrued before filing his complaint.
D.

The plaintiff has no vested right in an unconstitutional
statute.
The plaintiff has cited McClure v. Middletown Hospital

Association,

603

F.Supp.

1365

(S.D. Ohio

1985).

This, of

course, is a federal district court decision interpreting Ohio
state law and is not binding precedent in this action.

In fact,

McCluref s approach conflicts with the analysis which this Court
has used in its prior decisions.
The court in McClure based its decision on the plaintiff's claim to vested rights, asserting that the minor plaintiff
should have the benefit of the law as it stood at the time of
her birth.

However, in nearly every instance where a statute

is declared unconstitutional, one of the contesting parties can
claim "vested rights" accorded by the statute.

If the state of

the law as it existed when the cause of action accrued always
confers a vested interest in one of the parties litigant, it
follows that the Court must always confine its decisions to
prospective application.
Court has eschewed.
Lewis,

693

P. 2d

661

This is clearly a result which the

For example, the defendants in Malan v.
(Utah 1984) asserted
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that this Court's

decision declaring the Guest Statute unconstitutional should be
given

only

prospective

effect, because

at

the time of the

accident giving rise to the plaintiff's cause of action, the
Guest Statute had been held to be constitutionally sound in
Critchlev v. Vance, 575 P.2d 187 (Utah 197^).

Although Critchlev

was the law applicable to the party litigants when the plaintiff's action accrued, this Court employed a reasoned analysis to
determine that its decision should be retroactively applied.
This approach

is within the broad discretion accorded state

courts and does not contravene the United States Constitution.
In

Great

Northern

Railway

Cq.

v.

Sunburst

Oil &

Refining Co. . 287 U.S. 358, 53 S. Ct. 145, 77 L Ed. 360 (1932),
the foundation case regarding retroactivity, the United States
Supreme Court speaking through Justice Caif'dozo stated:
A state in defining the limits, of adherence
to precedent may make a choice for itself
between the principle of forward operation
and that of relation backward. It may say
that decisions of its highest Icourt, though
later overruled, are law nc^ne the less
for intermediate transactions. . . . On the
other hand, it may hold to the ancient dogma
that the law declared by its courts had a
Platonic or ideal existence before the act of
declaration, in which event theI discredited
declaration will be viewed as if it had never
been, and the reconsidered declaration as the
law from the beginning. The Alternative is
the same whether the subject): of the new
decision is common law or Statute.
The
choice for any state may be determined by the
juristic philosophy of the judges of her
courts, their conceptions of law, its origin
and nature.
We review, not the wisdom of
their philosophies, but the legjality of their
acts. (Citations omitted.)
-17-

Id. at 364-65, 53 S.Ct. at 148-49, 77 L. Ed. at 366-67.

This

court's approach to retroactive application of its decisions
is valid under the United States Constitution and defendants
respectfully submit that such analysis impels the Court in this
instance to retroactively apply Berry without exception.

CONCLUSION
The Utah Product Liability Act statute of repose was
intended to confer an immunity on manufacturers and the persons
in the manufacturers' chain of distribution

six years after

purchase and ten years after manufacture of the product.

The

statute was never intended nor has it ever functioned as a
statute prescribing the period during which an injured party must
bring his cause of action after it accrues.

Because the funda-

mental premise upon which the plaintiff bases his appeal is
erroneous, the trial court's order of April 2o, 1983, denying
the defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Appendix
A) should be reversed.
considered

to be

the

However, even if the statute of repose is
applicable

statute of limitation, the

plaintiff has demonstrated no rational basis for his contention
that this Court's decision in Berry should not be retroactively
applied to him and therefore the trial court's Order of Dismissal
entered March 20, 1986 (Appendix B) should be affirmed.
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DATED this

^ 5 ~ d a v of July, 1986.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL

Bv
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L. Rich fWmpherys
I
M. Douglas Bayly
A t t o r n e y s for Defendants Saab

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AND CROSS^APPELLANTS SAAB-SCANIA,
INC. AND SAAB-SCANIA AB was mailed, postage prepaid, this c>?rf ^—
day of July, 1986, to the following:
LeRoy S. Axland,
Michael W. Homer
Fred R. Silvester
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410|l-1480

^Mj
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i^j^l^ *

H.DIXC;; iiiu...-.

LARRY G. REED, Esq.
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (301) 532-7300

:|

.--.-

BY i ^ - t ^ ^ ^ S * ^

IM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LARRY RAITHAUS, M.D.,
Plaintiff,
vs
SAAB-SCANIA OF AMERICA, INC.,
a Connecticut corporation;
KEN GARFF FOREGIN CARS, INC.;
a Utah corporation; and SAABSCANIA OF SWEDEN, a Swedish
corporation,

.ORDER DENYING MOTION OF
DEFENDANTS SAAB-SCANIA OF
AMERICA AND SAAB-SCANIA OF
SWEDEN FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS

Civil No. C 82-9672

Defendants.
The Motion of Defendants Saab-Scania of America, Inc.
and Saab-Scania of Sweden, having come on regularly for hearing
before the above-entitled Court on the 11th day of April, 1983,
the Honorable Judith M. Billings presiding, and the Court having
reviewed the pleadings on file in this matter, including the Memoranda of Points and Authorities filed by plaintiff and said defendants, and having heard the arguments and representations of counsel,
M. Douglas Bayley, Esq., attorney for said defendants and Larry G.

APPENDIX A
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Reed, Esq., attorney for plaintiff, and it appearing to the Court
that:
(a)

The two-year statute of limitations applicable

to actions to recover damages for wrongful death found at
Section 78-12-28(2), Utah Code Ann. (Replacement Vol. 9A,
1977), is limited in its application by Section 78-12-1,
Utah Code Ann. (Replacement Vol. 9A, 1977) in that it: is
applicable " . . .

except where in special cases a different

limitation is prescribed by statute".
action is such a special case.

This "product liability"

The applicable statute of

limitations is found at Section 78-15-3(1), Utah Code Ann.
(Replacement Vol. 9A, 1977).

That Section, a portion of the

Utah Product Liability Act, Section 78-15-1 et. seq., Utah
Code Ann.(Replacement Vol. 9A, 1977), applies specifically
and exclusively to causes of action of the type asserted in
plaintiff r s complaint and is applicable to actions to recover
damages for wrongful death which are based on those causes of
action.
(b)

Principles of statutory construction, specifi-

cally the preference for the application of the longer of two
arguably applicable statutes of limitations, the principle that
should two statutes relating to the same general subject matter
be in conflict, the more specific of the two will control, and
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the principle that a later enacted statute will take precedence over a prior enacted statute which pertains to the
same general subject matter all indicate that the statute
of limitations contained in the Utah Product Liability Act,
rather than Section 78-12-28(2), is applicable.
(c)

The intent or the Legislature, as set forth in

Section 78-15-2, Utah Code Ann. (Replacement Vol. 9A, 1977)
is consistent with application of the six-year statute of
limitations which is found at Section 78-15-3(1) and a
contrary ruling would be inconsistent with the clear language
of the statute.
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing therefor, the Motion of Defendants Saab-Scania of America, Inc. and
Saab-Scania of Sweden be, and the same hereby is, denied.
DATED this

%f
7 y ?*

day of

U^H^i

, 1983.

T

H.rv;:C;>!H,vcL£Y

„

&«,

V/uUCt. SSI- QrJJj-nitf
J ith
lings

e^Hbnorable
norable

,. ^ . 4 i £ B i i ^ L T

"•^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Order Denying Motion of Defendants Saab-Scania
of America, Inc. and Saab-Scania of Sweden for Judgment on the
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Pleadings was mailed, this ££)

day of April, 1983, pursuant to

the provisions of Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice in the District
Courts of the State of Utah, to:
M. Douglas Bayly, EscJ.
Attorney for Defendants
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN £ POWELL
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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MAR20 1985

L. Rich Humpherys, A1582
M. Douglas Bayly, A0251
Christensen, Jensen & Powell
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS SAAB
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431

! I. Dixcn H i ^ i ^ C t e f k ^ T Diet. Coi
7

s' Cccjty G!eri<

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LARRY RAITHAUS, M.D.,
Plaintiffs,

])

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

]

v.
SAAB-SCANIA OF AMERICA, INC., ])
a Connecticut corporation;
])
KEN GARFF FOREIGN CARS, INC., ]
a Utah corporation; and
]
SAAB-SCANIA AB, a Swedish
;
corporation,
]
Defendants.

Civil No. C82-9672
Judge John A. Rokich

]

Defendant Saab's Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularl
before the court on the 7th day-of March, 1986, at the hour of
3:30 a.m.

Plaintiff was represented by his counsel, Fred Silvester

defendant Saab was represented by its counsel, L* Rich Humpherys-,
defendant Ken Garff Foreign Gars did not appear, it having previously settled its claim with the plaintiff.

The court, having

leard argument of counsel and having considered the memoranda of
counsel, together with all other information contained in the
court's file granted the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of
defendant Saab.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's

APPENDIX B
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Complaint shall be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice,
Defendant Saab shall be awarded its costs incurred herein.
DATED this :ylQ day of March, 1986*

BY THE COURT:

?JL // <Q±±

Judge John A. Rokich
^District Judge

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY

Deputy Clerk
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78-12-28. Within two years.—Within two years:
(1) An action against a marshal. shenii. constable or other officer upon
a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity, and in
virtue of his office, or by the omission of an official duty, including the
nonpayment of money collected upon an execution; bnt this section shall
not apply to an action for an escape.
(2) An action to recover damages for the death of one caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another.
History: L. 1951. ch. 58. § 1 : C. 1943,
Supp.. lO-i-12-23; L. 1971, dL 212, § 1 ; 1976.
ciL 23, § 13.

APPENDIX C
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78-15-2. Legislative findings and declarations—Ptirpose of act.—(1)
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for
damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from defective products has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases, the insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of
product liability insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and
increased claims has increased product cost through manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers passing the cost of premiums to the consumer. Further,
certain product manufacturers are discouraged from continuing to provide
and manufacture such products because of the high etist and possible unavailability of product liability insurance.
(2) In view of these recent trends, and for the purpose of alleviating
the adverse effects which these trends are producing ii^ the manufacturing
industry, it is necessary to protect the public interest bf enacting measures
designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide
product liability insurance.
(3) In enacting this act. it is the purpose of the legislature to provide
a reasonable time within which actions may be commenced against manufacturers, while limiting the time to a speciSc period | for which product
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated;
and to provide other procedural changes to expedite eqjiy evaluation and
settlement of claims.
History: C. 1953, 78-15-2, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 149, § 2.

APPENDIX D
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78-15-3. Statute of limitations—Application.—(1) No action shall be
brought for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage
to property more than six years after the date of initial purchase for
use or consumption, or ten years after the date of manufacture, of a product,
where that action is based upon, or arises out of. any of the following:
(a) Breach of any implied warranties;
(b) Defects in design, inspection, testing or manufacture;
(c) Failure to warn;
(d) Failure to properly instruct in the use of a product; or
(e) Any other alleged defect or failure of whatsoever kind or nature in
relation to a product.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless
of minority or other legal disability, but shall not apply to any cause of
action where the personal injury, death or damage to property occurs
within two years after the effective date of this act.
History: C. 1953, 78-15-3, enacted by
L. 1977, clL 149, § 3.
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